Distinct contributions of the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus to suspicion in a repeated bargaining game by Bhatt, Meghana A. et al.
Distinct contributions of the amygdala and
parahippocampal gyrus to suspicion in a repeated
bargaining game
Meghana A. Bhatta, Terry Lohrenzb, Colin F. Camererc, and P. Read Montagueb,d,1
aBeckman Research Institute, City of Hope, Duarte, CA 91010; bHuman Neuroimaging Laboratory, Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute, Roanoke, VA
24016; cDivision of Social Sciences and Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91025; and dWellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom
Edited by Terrence J. Sejnowski, Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla, CA, and approved April 13, 2012 (received for review January 13, 2012)
Humans assess the credibility of information gained from others
on a daily basis; this ongoing assessment is especially crucial for
avoiding exploitation by others. We used a repeated, two-person
bargaining game and a cognitive hierarchy model to test how
subjects judge the information sent asymmetrically from one
player to the other. The weight that they give to this information
is the result of two distinct factors: their baseline suspicion given
the situation and the suspicion generated by the other person’s
behavior. We hypothesized that human brains maintain an ongo-
ing estimate of the credibility of the other player and sought to
uncover neural correlates of this process. In the game, sellers were
forced to infer the value of an object based on signals sent from
a prospective buyer. We found that amygdala activity correlated
with baseline suspicion, whereas activations in bilateral parahip-
pocampus correlated with trial-by-trial uncertainty induced by the
buyer’s sequence of suggestions. In addition, the less credible
buyers that appeared, the more sensitive parahippocampal activa-
tion was to trial-by-trial uncertainty. Although both of these neu-
ral structures have previously been implicated in trustworthiness
judgments, these results suggest that they have distinct and sep-
arable roles that correspond to their theorized roles in learning
and memory.
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Social situations often require people to assess the credibilityof information communicated by others when there are
grounds for suspicion about what those other people say. This
requirement is especially true in competitive situations where
multiple people vie for a scarce resource and must use social
signals to garner information. We can roughly separate suspicion
into two parts. The first part is a priori, baseline suspicion based
on a person’s general beliefs about people in the world and the
situation at hand. The second part is the suspicion that is gen-
erated by the behavior of other people. Although this division is
obviously somewhat artificial—people’s baseline levels of suspi-
cion will change over time based on their experiences in the
world and people may be more or less responsive to suspicious
behavior based on their baseline levels of suspicion—it is a useful
starting place to start looking at how people assess the credibility
of information in social situations.
The amygdala has been implicated in processing social threat
in a number of situations (1, 2) and evaluating the trustworthi-
ness of faces (1, 3–5); thus, we hypothesized that activity within
the amygdala and associated structures, such as the parahippo-
campal gyrus, would correlate with baseline suspicion and the
uncertainty generated by other people’s behavior. To test this
hypothesis, we investigated strategic suspicion judgments be-
tween two players, a buyer and a seller, who played 60 rounds of
a bargaining task game during functional imaging.
In this bargaining game, one party, the buyer, has relevant,
accurate information about the value of an object. The other
party, the seller, receives a price suggestion from the buyer and
has to assess the credibility of the information to set a price for the
object. The subjects interact repeatedly, allowing the seller to
observe the buyer’s behavior over time, but importantly, the seller
does not get direct immediate feedback about the accuracy of the
information that he has received. In this paradigm, sellers receive
many possibly suspect suggestions from the buyer and must use
these suggestions to form beliefs about both the buyer’s value in
any given trial and the buyer’s level of credibility in general.
The buyer and seller play 60 rounds of a bargaining task (Fig.
1). At the beginning of each round, the buyer is informed of her
private value v of a hypothetical object. She is then asked to
suggest a price to the seller (values and prices are integers from 1
to 10). The seller then receives this suggestion and is asked to set
a price p. If the seller’s price is less than the private value v
(which is known only to the buyer), the trade executes, and the
seller receives p; the buyer receives v − p, the difference between
the private value and the selling price. If the seller’s price
exceeds the buyer’s value, the trade does not execute, and both
parties receive nothing. No feedback about whether the trade
occurred is provided to either player.
The object has no value to either player if a trade does not
occur. However, if a trade does occur, each player should prefer
a sales price that favors her. Because buyers prefer lower prices
and sellers prefer higher prices, this misalignment of incentives
implies that the only equilibrium solution of the one-round
version of this game is for no information transfer to occur (6).
The buyer should babble and send suggestions with no in-
formative relationship to her private value, and the seller should
ignore this suggestion and set a price of five or six. However, this
solution is the mutually optimal solution only if both players
believe that the other is also playing in equilibrium (i.e., babbling
is only optimal if the seller is, in fact, ignoring buyer suggestions
and ignoring buyer suggestions is only optimal if they contain no
meaningful information). In actuality, these types of games are
often out of equilibrium, requiring people to use more involved
models of belief formation such as the cognitive hierarchy style
of model. In these models, people, instead, assume that they are
always playing people who are less strategically sophisticated
than themselves. Higher-level players form increasingly sophis-
ticated models of how others might play, leading to a hierarchy
of strategic types (6–10).
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In fact, buyers empirically vary widely in their level of credibility,
with many buyers sending very reliable signals of their private
values. Given the lack of feedback in the task, the sellers are forced
to infer the honesty of the buyers from buyer suggestions alone.
The work by Bhatt et al. (11) examined the behavior and neural
activations of the buyers in this experiment and found that buyers
fell into three basic behavioral groups. Incrementalists—who were
relatively honest with their suggestions—and conservatives—who
used the rational strategy of not revealing information—formed
the bulk of the buyers (79% of the buyers) and were in roughly
equal proportions. The third group, the strategists, comprised
about 21% of the buyers and was actively deceptive, mimicking
incrementalist behavior by sending high suggestions during low-
value trials and reaping larger benefits by sending low suggestions
during high-value trials. These three types corresponded roughly
to levels 0, 1, and 2 players in a cognitive hierarchy model of the
game. Sellers responding to these buyers were faced with the task
of differentiating with whom they might be playing. Conservative
behavior is relatively easy to distinguish using the stream of buyer
suggestions, because suggestions from a conservative buyer gen-
erally had low variance. However, by the strategist’s design, the
suggestions of strategists and incrementalists are indistinguishable.
Given the relatively low percentage of strategists in the sample
and noting the general human tendency to assume that opponents
are likely to be less strategic than themselves, we assumed that
sellers were largely concerned with distinguishing conservatives
from incrementalists. In fact, in a cognitive hierarchy style model
of seller behavior, the differences in predicted behavior between
level 2 thinkers (who essentially assume that there are only in-
crementalists and conservatives) and level 3 thinkers (who ac-
knowledge the existence of strategists) are small (SI Materials and
Methods has details on model predictions and estimation, and
Table S1 shows CH classifications for all subjects).
Based on our assumptions, a simple proxy for sellers’ assess-
ment of buyer credibility is the SD of the suggestions received.
For example, if a seller only sees one or two different suggestions
over the course of the experiment, they can safely assume that the
buyer suggestions contain no meaningful information and ignore
them. If, however, the seller sees a wide variety of different sug-
gestions, it is possible that those suggestions are useful. However,
two sellers seeing the same stream of suggestions may still come
to different conclusions about their credibility (Fig. 2 A and B).
Results
Behavioral Results. We performed two separate behavioral analy-
ses of the data: one agnostic subject-level evaluation of the be-
havior based on a simple regression and one model-based within-
subject analysis that captured evolving beliefs about buyer cred-
ibility over time. In the first analysis, we regressed each seller’s
chosen prices on the buyer’s suggestions. This analysis yielded
three parameters of interest: the slope, intercept, and R2 of the
regression. This last parameter serves as a proxy for overall seller
credulousness, with high fits indicating that sellers reliably used
buyer suggestions and low fits indicating that they were not used
at all. We used the SD of buyer suggestions (ζ) as a between-
subject proxy for buyer-generated suspicion. R2 and ζ were cor-
related (r = 0.38, P < 0.001), but this correlation was driven al-
most entirely by those subjects where ζ was extremely low (ζ < 1),
forcing a low fit. Restricting our attention to subjects who saw
a greater variety of suggestions (ζ > 1, n = 64), the correlation
drops significantly (r = 0.21, P = 0.09). This relatively low cor-
relation suggests that differences in buyer credibility alone did not
adequately explain seller suspicion and that there were significant
endogenous drivers of seller suspicion. To focus on these en-
dogenous drivers of suspicion, we regressed this R2 on ζ and let
our measure of baseline suspicion (ψ) be the residuals from this
regression multiplied by −1. This measure proves to be relatively
stable throughout the task. (SI Materials and Methods, Fig. S1).
In the second model-based analysis, we computed a parameter
describing buyer-generated uncertainty about the buyer’s type
(i.e., the uncertainty induced by buyer’s suggestions about the
buyer’s credibility). In this model, we assume that sellers believe
that buyers are relatively naïve and send suggestions according to
s ¼ maxð1;minð10; ½αvþ εÞÞ, where [x] is the nearest integer to
x. Essentially, sellers believe that buyers are sending a linearly
scaled version of their true value. Notice that, in this model, the
slope of the suggestion function, α, is a proxy for the credibility of
the buyer. The closer that α is to zero, the less information that
the seller can glean from the suggestions. Buyers with low α
correspond to the conservatives described in the work by Bhatt
et al. (11), whereas those buyers with higher α correspond to the
incrementalists. We assume that each seller is constantly gener-
ating and updating beliefs about the credibility of the buyer based
on both the stream of suggestions and the assumption that the
underlying values are uniformly distributed (SI Materials and
Methods has full details). Using this model, strategic uncertainty
about buyer credibility is represented by the distribution of
Fig. 1. Experimental task. At the beginning of each round, the computer assigns a value for the widget to the buyer. The buyer suggests a price to the seller,
who uses this information to set a final price for the object. The computer automates whether the deal occurs—if the price is less than or equal to the buyer’s
value v, the seller receives the price p, and the buyer receives the difference between the price and his private value, v − p. Otherwise, the deal fails, and
neither party receives anything. Neither party is informed of the outcome of the previous trial, and payoffs are just added to a running tally of points kept by
the computer.
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seller’s beliefs over α (ranging from credible at α = 1 to babbling
at α= 0). We used the entropy of this distribution as a measure of
the seller’s uncertainty about the buyer’s type in each trial. We
calculated these entropies assuming limited memory based only
on the current and previous trials’ suggestions. Fig. 2C shows
a heat map representation of this measure based on every possible
combination of previous and current trial suggestions. Notice that
strategic uncertainty about buyer type is minimized when sellers
see a high suggestion, implying that they are likely to be relatively
credible, but it is also relatively low when they only see low sug-
gestions, implying that they are definitely untrustworthy.
In addition to these quantitative analyses, we collected de-
briefing from all subjects—asking them how they chose to ap-
proach the task. Many sellers reported being highly suspicious of
buyer suggestions (multiple sellers used the phrase lowball when
discussing buyers’ suggestions). For example, one seller wrote, “I
assumed I could NOT trust the buyer and that he might try to rip
me off at any chance he had.” Unsurprisingly, this seller showed
relatively high ψ despite playing a fairly credible buyer (0.26;
among the top 25% of sellers in baseline suspicion). Another
suspicious seller reported assuming that the buyer was always
“lying.” Conversely, one of the more trusting players stated, “I
took a low-risk approach on the idea that the buyer would not
bid at or above the price . . .” Unlike the suspicious sellers, he did
not use words like “trust” or “lying” anywhere in his description.
Importantly, no subjects expressed suspicion that they might not
be playing another human being, with most referring to the buyer
as “he” or “she.”
Functional MRI Results.The amygdala has been associated with fear,
especially fear generated by socially threatening cues, and the
evaluation of trustworthiness (5). We hypothesized that amygdala
activity should bemodulated by both buyer-generated and baseline
suspicions. To test the hypothesis, we regressed neural activity over
the decision epoch on both ψ and ζ for each subject and applied
small-volume corrections in the 20-mm spheres around the foci of
amygdala activation found in the study by Winston et al. (5) of the
evaluation of trustworthy faces. Bilateral dorsal amygdala activa-
tion correlated strongly with ψ [P < 0.001 uncorrected, P < 0.05
corrected for the familywise error in the 20-mm spheres around
(18, 0, −24) and (−16, −4, −20), respectively]. These results in-
dicate that amygdala activity correlates more with internally gen-
erated, a priori levels of suspicion than externally cued suspicion
(Fig. 3). No clusters correlated to ζ survived correction for multiple
comparisons either at the whole-brain level or with the small-vol-
ume correction (Tables S2 and S3 are complete activation tables).
Within-subject analysis showed that bilateral parahippocam-
pus activity correlates with our trial-level measures of buyer-
generated uncertainty at trial onset. Specifically, the less certain
that a seller was about a buyer’s type, the more active that the
parahippocampus was; this bilateral activation survived whole-
brain correction for multiple comparisons at the 0.05 level
(cluster correction using an uncorrected threshold of P < 0.001).
Region of interest analyses on these two clusters reveal that the
degree to which these areas correlate with buyer-generated un-
certainty, as measured by the average regression coefficient on
trial-by-trial entropy over the cluster, is significantly negatively
Fig. 2. (A) Although there is no feedback in this task, sellers make inferences about buyer credibility based on the stream of suggestions that they see. Two
sellers seeing the same stream of suggestions may come to very different conclusions based on their a priori beliefs about how trustworthy buyer suggestions
are likely to be. A suspicious seller (red) will generally ignore the buyer’s suggestion, whereas an unsuspicious seller seeing the same suggestions (blue) will
tend to base their chosen prices on the buyer’s suggestions. (B) Empirically, sellers seeing similar streams of suggestions, as measured by the SD of those
suggestions (ζ), showed widely varying behavior, as measured by the R2 of the regression of the seller’s chosen prices on the buyer’s suggestions. The scatter
plot shows that many seller’s showed near zero R2 values despite seeing highly variable suggestions, whereas others displayed fits approaching one. The red
lines represent the residuals of the R2 regressed on ζ, and we multiplied this quantity by −1 to get ψ, our measure of baseline suspicion. (C) We modeled how
sellers should rationally make inferences about buyer credibility based on the buyer’s current and latest suggestion. We used the entropy of their beliefs
about the buyer’s type in any given trial as a measure of buyer-generated uncertainty. Uncertainty is minimized when the buyer sends high suggestions,
implying their relative credibility. Interestingly, uncertainty is maximized when buyers send one low and one intermediate suggestion, because two low
suggestions can actually make the seller relatively certain that the buyer is untrustworthy.
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correlated with ζ. This finding shows that sellers playing buyers
who are measurably and detectably less credible over the entire
experiment show more trial-by-trial sensitivity to buyer-gener-
ated uncertainty (Fig. 4 and Table S4 and S5).
Discussion
It has been hypothesized that the amygdala’s primary function is
the integration of emotional cues with social and cognitive pro-
cesses (12). The literature describing the amygdala’s role in the
fear response is extensive. It has been associated with aversion to
risk and loss during monetary gambles (13–16) as well as expe-
rience of regret (17). It has also been implicated in the percep-
tion of social threat (e.g., by identifying signs of fear in others,
such as fearful faces) (1, 2, 18) and other bodily cues (19) and
trustworthiness judgments (5). People with amygdala damage
show impairments in their ability to identify threatening social
stimuli and even show a decreased tendency to anthropomor-
phize nonhuman objects compared with controls (20).
Fig. 3. (A) Bilateral amygdala correlates with baseline suspicion. Left shows significant negative correlates to baseline suspicion across subjects (P < 0.001,
uncorrected). Center and Right show the scatter plots of ψ vs. average activation in the left and right amygdale, respectively, as measured by the average
general linear model coefficients from each cluster respectively. (B) The average time series for suspicious (red) and unsuspicious (blue) sellers in both clusters.
Suspicious and unsuspicious sellers were classified using a median split on ψ.
Fig. 4. Bilateral parahippocampal gyrus correlates with buyer-generated uncertainty. Left shows significant correlations to within-subject strategic un-
certainty at P < 0.001 uncorrected. Center and Right show that average general linear model coefficients on buyer-generated uncertainty in these clusters are
significantly correlated with the buyer’s overall implied credibility as measured by ζ.
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The current study shows a significant between-subject differ-
ence in amygdala activation based on how suspicious subjects
were of buyer suggestions. We find that amygdala activation
correlates with baseline suspicion, which is consistent with the
lesion literature showing impaired fear responses in people with
amygdala damage (1, 2, 14, 21) (i.e., people with lower average
amygdala activity were less suspicious overall), even controlling
for the implied credibility of the suggestions that they saw. Ex-
trapolating, one might predict that subjects with amygdala
damage would show no suspicion whatsoever. Notice that, if we
were to, instead, consider amygdala activation as a signal of
nonsocial risk aversion, we might expect the opposite result; if
sellers believed, as they seemed to do, that most buyers were
suggesting prices under the true value, using those suggestion
would ensure a transaction with a positive, low-risk payoff in
every round. In fact, as noted above, one of the least suspicious
sellers took this approach, calling it the low-risk strategy.
Activation in the parahippocampal gyrus and other areas of the
medial temporal lobe has generally been implicated in memory
formation and learning (22). The area has dense interconnectivity
with the amygdala, which has been theorized to interact with the
hippocampal complex, including the parahippocampus, in the for-
mation of emotional memories (23, 24). In fact, the amygdala and
hippocampal complex have been theorized to subserve the for-
mation of implicit/nondeclarative and explicit/declarative mem-
ory, respectively (25–27).
In this study, we have shown that the parahippocampal gyrus
and amygdala correlate with distinct aspects of trustworthiness
judgments. Although the amygdala correlates strongly with base-
line suspicion (arguably the more emotional aspect of trustwor-
thiness judgments), the parahippocampal gyrus correlates more
strongly with the rational trial-by-trial uncertainty generated by
another individual’s behavior. Additionally, this response to trial-
by-trial uncertainty is enhanced in sellers facing buyers that seem
more untrustworthy overall. The work by Sharot et al. (28) found
a similar dissociation between these two areas when studying the
feeling of remembering. In their study, amygdala activity was en-
hanced for memories of emotional images, whereas activity in the
parahippocampal gyrus was enhanced for memories of neutral
images. Similarly, in our study, amygdala activity is enhanced for
baseline suspicion rather than the uncertainty generated by an-
other person’s behavior, whereas activity in the parahippocampal
gyrus is enhanced during rational updating of beliefs about buyer
behavior, requiring retrieval of the buyer’s recent signals.
In this work, we have extended the literature about judgments
on trustworthiness to distinguish between simple baseline suspi-
cion and the ongoing learning process around uncertainty gen-
erated by another person’s behavior. The more emotional factor
of baseline suspicion is associated with activity in the amygdala,
consistent with the literature tying this area to fear processing.
However, themore rational factor of buyer-generated uncertainty
is associated with activity in the parahippocampal gyrus, consis-
tent with its role in memory retrieval and learning.
Materials and Methods
Subject Information. Subjects were recruited from a large database main-
tained by the Human Neuroimaging Laboratory. Most subjects were affili-
ated with the Medical Center or Rice in various ways. Subjects were recruited
in pairs and kept separate throughout the task, and therefore, the experi-
ment was completely anonymous. Subjects were informed that they were
playing a real person and seemed to believe this case to be true.
After filling out a standard screening form and giving consent, they were
given written instructions on the task. After reading the instructions, they
were walked through the task again verbally and asked to answer a few
questions about hypothetical bargaining rounds to make sure that they fully
understood the task. If any of these questions was answered incorrectly, the
mistake was explained, and another scenario was presented.
After both subjects were fully instructed, they were loaded into the
scanner and participated in 60 rounds of the bargaining task. At the end, they
were told their total earnings and given an open-ended debriefing sheet on
which they were asked to describe, in their own words, how they had
approached the task. Seventy-six pairs of subjects were scanned. However,
because of a mechanical error, functional MRI (fMRI) data were only acquired
for 74 of the sellers. Data are reported for this subset. Mean age for these
sellers was 29 y, SD was 7.6 y, and 45 of 74 subjects were female.
fMRI Methods. fMRI data were collected using 3-T Siemens scanners on 74
healthy subjects recruited in accordance with a protocol approved by the
Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board. High-resolution T1-
weighted scans were acquired using an MP-Rage sequence. Functional
images were acquired with repetition time (TR) = 2,000 ms and echo time
(TE) = 25 ms; 37 4-mm slices were acquired 30° off the anteroposterior
commissural line, yielding functional voxels that were 3.4 × 3.4 × 4 mm.
Data were preprocessed using SPM2 algorithms for slice-timing correction,
motion correction, coregistration, gray/white matter segmentation, and nor-
malization to the Montreal Neurological Institute template. Functional images
were smoothed spatially using an 8-mm Gaussian kernel. All data were high
pass-filtered (128 s); the regression error structure was assumed to be auto-
gressive with order 1 [AR(1)]. Postpreprocessing voxels were 4 × 4 × 4 mm.
We considered two general linear models on the data. Key presses, head
motion, and time derivatives were included as nuisance regressors in both
models. The first model used a boxcar regressor beginning at trial onset and
ending at decision parameterized by both the suggestion received and the
chosen price in each trial. The secondmodel used separate point regressors at
trial onset and decision that were both parameterized by the entropy of seller
beliefs about buyer type. Regressors were convolved with the standard he-
modynamic response function. After regions of interest were identified from
the whole-brain analysis, time series were extracted in each cluster and av-
eraged to produce time courses anchored to events of interest.
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